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JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE POLITICAL
QUESTION DOCTRINE: REVIVING THE
FEDERALIST "REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION"
ANALYSIS
ROBERT J. PUSHAW, JR.*
Implementing Federalist theory, the Constitution established a
presumption favoring judicial review, which could be rebutted
only by a few constitutional provisions (such as those governing
impeachment and appointments) that raised purely "political"
questions. This "rebuttable presumption" approach held sway
into the twentieth century.
Baker v. Carr replaced this Federalist political question doctrine
with one that requires a prudential balancing of many vague
factors. In practice, the Baker test has granted federal judges near-
absolute discretion, which has generally been exercised to decide
constitutional issues that implicate sensitive political matters.
Because the modem political question doctrine lacks legal
coherence, both in theory and as applied, the Court should
reintroduce the "rebuttable presumption" model in order to reach
more legally principled and consistent results.
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In Baker v. Carr,' the Supreme Court purported to do no more
than summarize and apply its precedent on political questions. In
reality, however, Justice Brennan's opinion transformed this doctrine
into a discretionary, case-by-case, six-factor inquiry based solely upon
separation of powers, not federalism.2 This new analysis enabled the
Court to achieve its immediate policy goal of restructuring every state
legislative and congressional district in America based upon its
discovery of a previously unnoticed "equal population" principle of
representation lurking in various constitutional provisions such as the
Equal Protection Clause.3
Unfortunately, the long-term effects of Baker have been
negative, as often happens when the Court unmoors itself from the
Constitution's text, structure, political theory, history, and precedent.
The traditional justification for judicial review is that federal courts
must decide cases by upholding the fundamental "law" of the written
Constitution against contrary government actions. But if the Justices
can discard this law and impose their ideological preferences in an
area as quintessentially and traditionally "political" as the states'
apportionment of their legislatures, then it becomes pointless to try to
distinguish "legal" from "political" questions.4
A recent illustration is Bush v. Gore,5 in which the conservative
Republican majority unconsciously paid homage to Baker by (1)
ignoring classical principles of justiciability and federalism, which
1. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
2. Id at 208-37.
3. Id at 226.
4. See Robert F. Nagel, Political Law, Legalistic Politics: A Recent History of the
Political Question Doctrine, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 643, 657-64 (1989) (contending that
modem constitutional decisions rest on political rather than legal principles, but that the
Court refuses to acknowledge this fact because doing so would compel it to refrain from
examining the political branches' judgments on policy questions).
5. 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
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counseled deference to states in electoral matters and (2) dictating a
political result justified by freshly minted equal protection
"standards. '6 I say "unconsciously" because the Bush Court did not
cite Baker, and indeed only fleetingly alluded to the political
overtones of its decision.7
This cavalier attitude reflects the degree to which the political
question doctrine has ceased to function as a meaningful
jurisdictional restraint. After Baker, the Court has almost always
exercised its unbridled discretion to intervene in even the most
heavily politicized disputes. Examples include various electoral
matters, Congress's procedures for enacting statutes, and the
President's assertion of executive privilege.8  Such questions,
however, are no less "political" than the only two issues found to be
nonjusticiable-military training9 and impeachment.1? For instance,
Article I provides that "[e]ach House shall be the Judge of the
Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members"'" and that
Congress "shall have the sole Power" over impeachment prosecutions
and trials.1 The Court has failed to explain persuasively why it
concluded, under Baker, that the former clause is amenable to
adjudication, 3 but the latter is not. 4
Because Baker lacks a firm constitutional foundation and
guarantees arbitrary results, no amount of tinkering can cure its
defects. Therefore, this Article suggests abandoning Baker and
substituting the Federalist approach to political questions, which
served the Court well for over a century. 5 Judges and scholars have
routinely cited Alexander Hamilton's argument supporting judicial
review, which the Marshall Court adopted: that only independent
federal courts can impartially determine whether or not political
branch officials have complied with the Constitution's written limits
6. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Bush v. Gore: Looking at Baker v. Carr in a
Conservative Mirror, 18 CONST. COMM. 341, 359-61, 382-86, 390-402 (2001) (developing
this thesis).
7. Bush, 531 U.S. at 111.
8. See infra notes 80-114 and accompanying text (citing cases).
9. See Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 5-12 (1973).
10. See Walter Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224,226-38 (1993).
11. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 5, cl. 1.
12. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 2, cl. 5 (authorizing the House of Representatives to
impeach); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (empowering the Senate to try impeachments).
13. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486,512-49 (1969).
14. See Nixon, 506 U.S. at 226-38; see also infra notes 115-20 and accompanying text
(discussing such inconsistencies).
15. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Justiciability and Separation of Powers: A Neo-
Federalist Approach, 81 CORNELL L. REv. 393,421-25,449-51,497-511 (1996).
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on their power imposed by "We the People. ' 16 But the Federalists'
corollary claim has been undeservedly ignored: The "natural
presumption" favoring judicial review can be rebutted by certain
constitutional provisions, interpreted in light of basic principles of
constitutional structure and theory.17 Far from being a relic of a
bygone age, this "rebuttable presumption" approach is actually more
logical and workable than the Baker test.
To establish this thesis, I will first try to demonstrate the
intellectual bankruptcy of the Court's current political question
jurisprudence. I will then describe the Federalist model and show
how it can be applied to modern cases to reach more legally
principled results rooted in the Constitution. 8
I. THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE IN THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY
A. The Prelude to Baker: A Strict Approach to Justiciability
During the first six decades of the twentieth century, the Court
applied the political question doctrine rigorously to fence out many
potential constitutional claims. For example, it declared in 1918 that
"[t]he conduct of the foreign relations of our Government is
committed by the Constitution to the Executive and Legislative-'the
political'-Departments ... , and the propriety of what may be done
in the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry
or decision."'" Similarly, in Coleman v. Miller,20 the Court ruled that
16. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176-80 (1803); THE FEDERALIST
No. 78, at 524-26 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
17. See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 168-71; THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note
16, at 524-25.
18. For other applications of this "Neo-Federalist" methodology, see generally
Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Article III's Case/Controversy Distinction and the Dual Functions of
Federal Courts, 69 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 447 (1994) (demonstrating that Article III
deliberately distinguishes between "cases" defined by subject matter, in which the federal
judiciary's main role is expounding the law, and "controversies" between identified
parties, which primarily require dispute resolution); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Congressional
Power Over Federal Court Jurisdiction: A Defense of the Neo-Federalist Interpretation of
Article III, 1997 BYU L. REV. 847, 847-97 (challenging the orthodox view that Congress
has plenary authority to divest federal courts of jurisdiction); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Why
the Supreme Court Never Gets Any "Dear John" Letters: Advisory Opinions in Historical
Perspective, 87 GEO. L.J. 473, 477-97 (1998) (recovering the Federalist approach to
advisory opinions).
19. Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297,302 (1918); see also Chi. & S. Air Lines,
Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948) ("[T]he very nature of executive
decisions as to foreign policy is political, not judicial.").
20. 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
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questions under Article V concerning the validity of federal
constitutional amendments (for example, whether they had been
ratified within a reasonable time after their proposal) were "political"
and entrusted exclusively to Congress?'
Most pertinent to Baker are the cases beginning in 1912 that
deemed nonjusticiable all complaints arising under Article IV,
Section 4, which provides that "the United States shall guarantee to
every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government." To
illustrate, the Court refused to consider claims that states had
rendered their governments "unrepublican" by (1) passing certain
laws by initiative rather than statute;' (2) delegating legislative power
to executive agenciesz3  or courts;24  (3) enacting worker's
compensation laws; 5 (4) permitting a rule that statutes could be
invalidated only if every state court justice (or all but one) agreed;26
and (5) amending the state constitution through certain procedures.27
The Court applied this precedent to the specific context of state
apportionment schemes, starting in 1916 2  After World War II,
constitutional challenges to such state laws intensified. In the
landmark case of Colegrove v. Green,29 four of the seven participating
Justices affirmed the dismissal of a complaint alleging that an Illinois
statute had unconstitutionally established districts for federal
congressional representatives that did not reflect population
changes.3 In the plurality opinion, Justice Frankfurter and two
colleagues ruled that "[v]iolation of the great guaranty of a republican
form of government in States cannot be challenged in the courts."' In
a concurrence, Justice Rutledge expressed his personal view that
21. Seven Justices, in three separate opinions, endorsed this view. See icL at 450-55
(plurality opinion of Hughes, C.J.); itd at 456-60 (Black, J., concurring); id. at 460-70
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
22. See Pac. States Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118,142-51 (1912); see also idL at 139-
41 (rejecting the plaintiff's attempt to evade this result by asserting a separate cause of
action under the Fourteenth Amendment).
23. Highland Farms Dairy, Inc. v. Agnew, 300 U.S. 608,612 (1937).
24. O'Neill v. Learner, 239 U.S. 244,248 (1915).
25. Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219,234-35 (1917).
26. Ohio ex reL Bryant v. Akron Metro. Park Dist., 281 U.S. 74,79-80 (1930).
27. Marshall v. Dye, 231 U.S. 250,256-57 (1913).
28. Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565, 569-70 (1916) (holding
nonjusticiable the claim that the invalidation of a state reapportionment statute by
referendum violated the Republican Form of Government Clause).
29. 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
30. Id. at 550-56 (plurality opinion of Frankfurter, J.); id. at 564-66 (Rutledge, J.,
concurring).
31. Id. at 556 (plurality opinion) (citing Pacific Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118
(1912)).
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Sections 2 through 5 of Article I conferred on Congress exclusive
power over federal legislative districting, but declared himself bound
by a previous decision that had found this issue justiciable.2 He
concluded, however, that the district court had equitable discretion to
decline to exercise jurisdiction in light of the delicate relationship
between Congress and the states in determining congressional
districts.33 Three dissenters saw no political question obstacle and
would have struck down the statute on equal protection grounds.0
4
In MacDougall v. Green,35 Justice Rutledge in another
concurrence urged the Court to refrain, in equity, from considering a
constitutional attack on an Illinois law that gave sparsely populated
counties disproportionate power in the nomination of candidates for
statewide office.36 A bare majority of five Justices, however, reached
the merits and held:
To assume that political power is a function exclusively of
numbers is to disregard the practicalities of government.
Thus, the Constitution protects the interests of the smaller
against the greater by giving in the Senate entirely unequal
representation to populations. It would be strange indeed,
and doctrinaire, for this Court, applying such broad
constitutional concepts as due process and equal protection
of the laws, to deny a State the power to assure a proper
diffusion of political initiative as between its thinly
populated counties and those having concentrated
masses .... 37
Two years later, in South v. Peters,38 the Court cited Colegrove
and MacDougall in tersely rejecting a Fourteenth Amendment
challenge to Georgia's "county unit" system of primary voting, which
significantly overweighted votes in rural counties: "Federal courts
consistently refuse to exercise their equity powers in cases posing
political issues arising from a state's geographical distribution of
electoral strength among its political subdivisions."39 This analysis
seemed to combine the "equitable discretion" approach of Justice
Rutledge with the Frankfurterian "political question" paradigm.
32. Id. at 564-65 (Rutledge, J., concurring) (citing Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355
(1932)).
33. Id. at 565-66 (Rutledge, J., concurring).
34. Id. at 572-74 (Black, J., dissenting).
35. 335 U.S. 281 (1948).
36. See id. at 284-87 (Rutledge, J., concurring in the judgment).
37. Id. at 283-84.
38. 339 U.S. 276 (1950).
39. Id. at 277.
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Between South and Baker, the Court dismissed every
constitutional challenge to state apportionment laws, usually on
political question grounds.4 The lone exception occurred when states
racially discriminated in electoral matters, thereby violating
individual and minority-group rights under the Fifteenth
Amendment.4'
B. Baker v. Carr
1. The Court's Opinions
In Baker v. Carr,42 urban voters alleged that Tennessee's
apportionment statute, which had not been amended for sixty years
to account for the large migration away from rural areas, violated the
Equal Protection Clause by diluting the weight of their votes.43 Like
most states, Tennessee had always divided up legislative districts to
reflect various factors (for example, demographics, geography,
politics, economics, social classes, history, and efficiency), often with
the aim of maximizing the electoral clout of conservative rural areas
against the mushrooming (and predominantly liberal) cities and
suburbs." Consequently, sparsely settled counties enjoyed
representation grossly disproportionate to their populations.45
40. The reasoning of these decisions is difficult to discern because they featured
telegraphic per curiam opinions, some of which simply cited Colegrove. See, e.g., Kidd v.
McCanless, 352 U.S. 920 (1956) (involving the same Tennessee statute that would be
disputed in Baker); see also Matthews v. Handley, 361 U.S. 127 (1959); Radford v. Gary,
352 U.S. 991 (1957); Anderson v. Jordan, 343 U.S. 912 (1952); Remmey v. Smith, 342 U.S.
916 (1952); Tedesco v. Bd. of Supervisors, 339 U.S. 940 (1950). Two earlier cases reached
similar results. See Colegrove v. Barrett, 330 U.S. 804 (1947); Turman v. Duckworth, 329
U.S. 675 (1946). Some of these decisions affirmed lower federal court orders that had
been based on political question grounds. See generally Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 252
(1962) (Clark, J., concurring) (noting that, regardless of Colegrove's actual holding, the
Court had interpreted the decision as based upon nonjusticiability and a refusal to accept
any possible Fourteenth Amendment claim); LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT
AND AMERICAN POLITICS 201-02 (2000) (concluding that, before Baker, everyone had
assumed that Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Colegrove stated the Court's holding).
41. For example, Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960), invalidated an Alabama
statute which had redistricted a city in order to deprive blacks of their right to vote. lId at
340-45. The Court distinguished this "singl[ing] out [of] a readily isolated segment of a
racial minority for special discriminatory treatment" from the political question presented
in Colegrove, where the plaintiffs "complained only of a dilution of the strength of their
votes." Id at 346.
42. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
43. Id at 187-95. The following discussion of Baker draws heavily upon Pushaw,
supra note 6, at 364-67, and Pushaw, supra note 15, at 489-501.
44. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 188-95 (describing this allocation of legislative seats
according to group interests); id at 248-49 n.4 (Douglas, J., concurring) (stressing the
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Longstanding law required dismissal of the complaint, as the
district court held46 and Justices Frankfurter and Harlan argued in
their dissenting opinions.4 7 They demonstrated that the Court had
always refused to interfere with apportionment for two closely related
reasons. First, federalism prohibited judicial second-guessing of state
officials' political judgment in balancing the numerous and complex
policy considerations involved.4  Second, challenges to
apportionment laws necessarily rested upon the claim that a state did
not have a "Republican Form of Government" under Article IV, a
constitutional clause that the Court had long deemed nonjusticiable.49
In the dissenters' view, the plaintiffs could not avoid this uniform
precedent simply by relabeling their complaint as alleging the
violation of individual voting rights under the Equal Protection
Clause." Nothing in the language or precedent of that Clause, or any
other constitutional provision, required states to base representation
solely on population, and the Constitution authorized several other
electoral schemes that rested on different principles, such as the
Senate.5 1  Thus, Justices Frankfurter and Harlan concluded that
ordering all state legislatures to be reconstituted based upon the
majority's belief in the wisdom of "equal population" representation
would destroy federalism and threaten the Court's reputation as a
nonpartisan enforcer of the law.
5 2
serious underrepresentation of cities in most state legislatures); cf. id. at 268-69, 300-24
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Constitution gave states exclusive power to
balance these competing policy considerations). Although the Justices did not mention
the ideological implications of apportionment, rural overrepresentation entrenched the
political power of conservatives against more liberal urbanites, whose voting numbers had
skyrocketed as Americans moved in droves to cities. See Gus Tyler, Court Versus
Legislature, 27 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 390,395-98 (1962).
45. Baker, 369 U.S. at 253-58 (Clark, J., concurring) (citing statistics).
46. 1L at 208-09.
47. Id at 266-330 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); it at 330-49 (Harlan, J., dissenting);
see also id. at 284-85 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (distinguishing Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S.
355 (1932), as involving not a broad constitutional challenge to the structure of state
government, but rather a particular federal question that determined relationships within
that existing framework).
48. ML at 266-70, 277-80, 284-97, 300, 323-24 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); iL at 332-
33,336-37 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 266-70, 289-302 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); id. at 333-34 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
50. Id. at 297-301 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); id. at 331-34 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 300-23 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); id. at 332-39 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 332-33, 338-40 (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also id at 267-70, 284-86, 289,
298-301, 324 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (making this point and stressing the Court's
traditional unwillingness to interfere with state governments, absent violation of an
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Confronted with the dissenters' irrefutable legal arguments, but
unwilling to overrule its precedent explicitly, the majority dissembled.
Most importantly for present purposes, Justice Brennan surveyed the
major "political question" cases and reached two debatable
conclusions.
First, he asserted that "it is the relationship between the judiciary
and the coordinate branches of the Federal Government, and not the
federal judiciary's relationship to the States, which gives rise to the
'political question.' " Hence, Justice Brennan deemed this doctrine
inapplicable because the Court was not considering a question
decided by a coequal branch, but rather "the consistency of state
action with the Federal Constitution."-4
Second, Justice Brennan declared that the existence of a political
question could be determined only through a "case-by-case inquiry
'55
weighing six factors:
explicit, judicially enforceable constitutional command such as the Fifteenth
Amendment's prohibition against racial discrimination in voting).
Many scholars amplified the dissenters' reasoning. They contended that every
apportionment law reflected a complex political process that weighed many factors, such
as population, geography, a desire to maintain existing governmental entities (such as
counties), socioeconomics (e.g., ensuring representation for minority groups), and political
considerations (e.g., preserving a viable two-party system). See, e.g., Alexander M. Bickel,
The Durability of Colegrove v. Green, 72 YALE LJ. 39, 40-45 (1962); Stanley H.
Friedelbaum, Baker v. Carr: The New Doctrine of Judicial Intervention and its
Implications for American Federalism, 29 U. CI. L. RaV. 673, 692-93, 698 (1962); Jerold
Israel, On Charting a Course Through the Mathematical Quagmire: The Future of Baker v.
Carr, 61 MICH. L. REv. 107, 108-13, 124, 130-34 (1962); Jo Desha Lucas, Legislative
Apportionment and Representative Government: The Meaning of Baker v. Carr, 61 MIcH.
L. REV. 711, 750-51, 756, 764-76 (1963); Robert G. McCloskey, The Supreme Court, 1961
Term-Foreword The Reapportionment Case, 76 HARv. L. REv. 54, 55, 63, 71-73 (1962);
Phil C. Neal, Baker v. Carr Politics in Search of Law, 1962 SuP. Cr. REV. 252, 253, 267,
274-86, 289-90; Allan P. Sindler, Baker v. Carr: How to "Sear the Conscience" of
Legislators, 72 YALE L.J. 23, 28-38 (1962). These critics established that nothing in the
text, underlying political theory, history, or precedent of the Constitution (including the
Equal Protection Clause) suggested a simplistic one-person, one-vote standard for
apportionment. See Bickel, supra, at 40-41; Israel, supra, at 130-34; Lucas, supra, at 769-
75, 802-04; McCloskey, supra, at 71-73; Neal, supra, at 275, 279-80, 284-86, 326; Sindler,
supra, at 33. Indeed, they emphasized that the impossibility of devising and applying
practical constitutional principles, as well as respect for federalism, explained the Court's
consistent refusal to upset state electoral laws based upon general claims of
unreasonableness. See, e.g., Friedelbaum, supra, at 673-88, 691; Lucas, supra, at 711-48,
751-52,803.
53. Baker, 369 U.S. at 210; see also id. at 217 ("[A] political question... [is] essentially
a function of the separation of powers.").
54. Id at 226.
55. Id. at 211; see also id. at 217 (stating that the political question cases "show the
necessity for discriminating inquiry into the precise facts and posture of the particular
case, and the impossibility of resolution by any semantic cataloguing").
2002] 1173
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Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a
political question is found a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of
deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a
court's undertaking independent resolution without
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government; or an unusual need for unquestioning
adherence to a political decision already made; or the
potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious
pronouncements by various departments on one question5 6
Applying these criteria, the majority admitted that the voters'
challenge, if made under the Guarantee Clause, would have raised a
political question. 7 Nonetheless, the Court held that (1) the Equal
Protection Clause did provide manageable standards for reviewing
state apportionment laws and (2) the other five factors were not
implicated because the case did not involve a coequal federal
branch.8  Instead of specifying concrete legal principles of
constitutional equality in the districting context, however, Justice
Brennan merely offered one cryptic sentence:
Judicial standards under the Equal Protection Clause are
well developed and familiar, and it has been open to courts
since the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment to
determine, if on the particular facts they must, that a
discrimination reflects no policy, but simply arbitrary and
capricious action.5 9
56. I& at 217.
57. It at 209-10, 217-29. Justice Brennan offered two qualifications, however. First,
he asserted that, in certain unusual circumstances, the Court might be able to determine
the "extreme limits" imposed by the Republican Form of Government Clause (thereby
meeting the "judicially manageable standards" factor), but that other elements of a
political question might still be present (e.g., commitment of the issue to political branch
decisionmaking). Idt at 222-23 n.48 (citing Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 45
(1849); Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162,175-76 (1875); In re Duncan, 139 U.S.
449, 461 (1891)). Second, he pointed out that a possible Guarantee Clause problem did
not bar judicial review when some other constitutional provision had allegedly been
violated. See id. at 226 n.53 (citing Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559 (1911)); see also infra
notes 174-95 and accompanying text (analyzing the relevant Republican Form of
Government cases).
58. Baker, 369 U.S. at 188,208-10,226-32,237.
59. Id. at 226 (emphasis added); see PowE, supra note 40, at 202 ("[T]his statement is
breathtaking. There were so few non-race equal protection cases that no one could
confidently assert what the equal protection standard was. Yet Brennan said just the
opposite....").
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In short, the Court pretended to honor, but effectively reversed,
the long-established law governing political questions and equal
protection in order to implement the Justices' personal vision of
appropriate representation in a democracy.'
2. The Problem With Baker
Baker's six factors cannot meaningfully distinguish "political"
questions from justiciable "legal" ones.61 For instance, the Court's
exercise of jurisdiction over any case arising under the Constitution
almost inevitably shows a "lack of the respect due coordinate
branches of government," upsets a "political decision already made"
that Congress or the President may believe demands "unquestioning
adherence," or holds "the potentiality of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one
60. Professor Schotland contends that the Baker Court did not explicitly overrule any
cases in order to garner the crucial vote of Justice Stewart, who insisted on this condition.
See Roy A. Schotland, The Limits of Being "Present at the Creation," 80 N.C. L. REV.
1505, 1508-10 (2002). He concludes that "Professor Pushaw, like Professor McConnell, is
in denial about the fact that a majority opinion might be crafted to be supported by a
majority." Id. at 1509 n.19.
On the contrary, I am fairly confident that Michael McConnell is aware (as I am)
that Justices sometimes make compromises in writing opinions to gain their colleagues'
acquiescence. Nonetheless, we expect the Court to display at least a minimum level of
candor, particularly in characterizing its previous decisions. As Professor McConnell has
convincingly argued, Baker and its progeny created a rigid one-person, one-vote principle
that had no foundation in the Equal Protection Clause's language, history, or precedent.
See Michael McConnell, The Redistricting Cases: Original Mistakes and Current
Consequences, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 103, 103-13 (2000).
Professor McConnell refines the devastating contemporaneous critiques leveled at
Baker by distinguished scholars such as Alex Bickel and Robert McCloskey. See supra
note 52 (citing these and other commentators). Perhaps most tellingly, even the legal
academics who applauded Baker did not do so on the ground that the majority had
faithfully followed precedent. Indeed, many of them praised the Court for "abruptly
reversing [its] whole position." See Thomas I. Emerson, Malapportionment and Judicial
Power, 72 YALE L.J. 64,79 (1962); see also Pushaw, supra note 6, at 368-69 (citing similar
sentiments expressed by Charles Black, Louis Pollak, Robert McKay, and Carl
Auerbach). Significantly, neither Professor Schotland nor anyone else has explained how
Justice Brennan's opinion adhered to existing case law on the Equal Protection Clause.
Similarly disingenuous was the Court's treatment of the political question cases,
particularly those involving apportionment. See supra notes 19-41 and accompanying text
(discussing these decisions); supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text (summarizing the
analysis of this precedent by Justices Frankfurter and Harlan); infra notes 72-78 and
accompanying text (demonstrating that the Baker Court distorted prior political question
cases); POWE, supra note 40, at 202 (lamenting the "confusion" that resulted from Justice
Brennan's "cumbersome strategy" of recategorizing all preceding political question
decisions (including Colegrove) to try to suggest that they did not cover apportionment).
61. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICrION 145-46 (3d ed. 1999); J.
Peter Mulhern, In Defense of the Political Question Doctrine, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 97, 163
(1988); Pushaw, supra note 15, at 500-01.
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question." 62 The reason is simple: Horizontal judicial review requires
a searching examination of an act of Congress or the executive
branch, and a decision to strike down such an action necessarily
implies that the political officials who took it either violated their
oaths to uphold the Constitution or were ignorant of its meaning.
Likewise, many constitutional provisions, not just those the
Court has deemed "political," appear to "lack judicially discoverable
and manageable standards."'63 Indeed, the Equal Protection Clause,
intended to protect the civil rights of individuals and minorities rather
than general political rights such as voting, did not contain any
standards for measuring the myriad political judgments involved in
state apportionment statutes.64  Undaunted, the majority
"discovered" such principles and later found a way to "manage"
them.65 Furthermore, Baker seemed to entail "an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion"66 (as the
dissenters strenuously argued),67 and the Court did not explain which
policy decisions would "clearly" be left to the political branches. In
fact, much of modem constitutional law arguably involves policy
choices that should be resolved through the political process.61
Finally, if "a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment
of the issue to a coordinate political department" 69 raised a political
quesion, then federal courts could never decide any claims against
Congress or the President because the text of Articles I and II
commits to them all legislative and executive powers. Instead, the
dispositive consideration is whether a constitutional issue must be
entrusted to a political actor for a final, nonreviewable decision.70
That determination, however, cannot be made simply by consulting
the words of the Constitution, which does not contain a specific clause
authorizing judicial review, much less set forth exceptions to that
62. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
63. See id.; see also MARTIN H. REDISH, THE FEDERAL COURTS IN THE POLITICAL
ORDER 122-26, 135 (1991) (arguing that the Court routinely creates and develops detailed
standards to govern constitutional provisions that contain very general language).
64. See Akhil R. Amar, The Central Meaning of Republican Government: Popular
Sovereignty, Majority Rule, and the Denominator Problem, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 749, 753-
54 (1994).
65. See supra notes 58-60; infra notes 80-91, 102-03 and accompanying text
(describing these cases).
66. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
67. See supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
68. See, e.g., LINO A. GRAGLIA, COURTING DISASTER: THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE DEMISE OF POPULAR GOVERNMENT 5-38 (1997).
69. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
70. See Pushaw, supra note 15, at 500-01.
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power.71  Rather, just as judicial review rests principally on the
Constitution's structure and underlying political theory, so too must
the political question doctrine.
Unfortunately, the Baker Court simply cast aside a core
structural and theoretical principle-federalism. Contrary to the
majority's assertions, many of the Court's political question opinions
had expressed concerns for preserving federalismE---including those
that involved the precise issue of the constitutionality of state
apportionment laws.73 Indeed, over the previous three decades every
challenge (fifteen in all) to such legislative schemes had been
dismissed.74 Justice Brennan attempted to distinguish these cases as
grounded upon limits on the federal judiciary's equity power, not
upon justiciability.75 Although this distinction explains a few of these
decisions7 6 others rested on the political question doctrine,77 and in all
of them the Court declined to interfere out of respect for state
autonomy in determining legislative representation plans.78
Jettisoning federalism as a factor in the political question
calculus, although helpful in enabling the Baker majority to
rationalize its result, has had the long-range effect of opening up large
new political vistas to judicial review.79  Nowhere has this
phenomenon been more pronounced than in the electoral arena.
71. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 61, at 146.
72. See supra notes 22-40 and accompanying text; infra notes 172-73, 181-83 and
accompanying text (describing this precedent).
73. See supra notes 28-40 and accompanying text.
74. See Friedelbaum, supra note 52, at 673-88, 691 (discussing these cases).
75. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,231-37 (1962).
76. See, e.g., South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276,277 (1950).
77. See supra note 40 (citing cases).
78. Professor Lucas showed that the majority's attempt to distinguish these decisions
was misleading. Lucas, supra note 52, at 711-48, 751-52, 803. He acknowledged, however,
that the Court had considered the merits in a few of these cases, and thus that
apportionment did not always involve political questions. Id at 713-14. Lucas concluded
that prior judicial rulings that apportionment raised "nonjusticiable" issues under the
Guarantee Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment actually reflected substantive
determinations that those constitutional provisions did not confer individual legal rights.
Id. at 754-55.
79. Even if Baker and its progeny ultimately made state legislatures more responsive
to the concerns of their urban areas, these cases surely did not "strengthen[] federalism,"
as Professor Schotland and others have contended. See Schotland, supra note 60, at 1509
n.19 (citing sources). To begin with, Justice Brennan himself expressly discarded
federalism as a relevant factor in the political question equation. See Baker, 369 U.S. at
210, 226, discussed supra notes 53-54, 58 and accompanying text. Moreover, seven
unelected Justices imposed their personal view (expressed nowhere in the Constitution)
that representation had to be based entirely on population, and they gave federal district
judges a roving commission to implement that vision by reconfiguring every state
legislature in America. It is hard to imagine a more serious affront to federalism, which
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C. The Application of Baker to Electoral Matters
The Court quickly consolidated the "gains" of Baker." Most
importantly, it found justiciable a challenge by Alabama voters to the
malapportionment of their legislature in Reynolds v. Sims."t
Specifically, the Justices concluded that Congress's admission into the
Union of Alabama and other states with apportionments not based
on population, and thus its implicit judgment that these states had a
Republican Form of Government, did not prevent the Court from
determining whether such schemes violated the Equal Protection
Clause.82 On the substantive issue, the Court interpreted that Clause
as requiring apportionment to be based on a "one-person, one-vote"
principle.8 3 The majority rejected Justice Harlan's contention that the
Fourteenth Amendment's text, legislative history, and implementing
practice and precedent revealed that there were no judicially
enforceable limits on the states' exclusive and plenary power over
legislative apportionment-a crucial aspect of federalism.'l
Similarly, Justice Harlan argued in vain in Wesberry v. Sanderss5
that a Georgia law establishing single-member congressional districts
with unequal populations presented a political question under Article
I, Section 4: "The Times, Places, and Manner of holding
[congressional] Elections... shall be prescribed in each State by the
Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make
or alter such Regulations .... "86 He showed that the language of
Section 4, considered in historical context, gave Congress alone the
authority to review the states' exercise of their power to select their
representatives according to any method of election they chose. 7 The
Court nonetheless concluded that Section 4 did not immunize state or
requires that the federal government respect the freedom of the states to structure and
operate their governments, absent a genuine violation of the Constitution (such as racial
discrimination).
80. For a detailed analysis of these post-Baker cases, see Pushaw, supra note 6, at 372-
78.
81. 377 U.S. 533,537-59 (1964).
82. Id. at 582.
83. Id. at 561-76. The Court first coined this slogan in Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368,
370-72, 379-80 (1963), which held that the Equal Protection Clause mandated an equally
weighted vote for all who participated in an election. Accordingly, the Court invalidated
Georgia's county-unit method of weighing votes in primary elections, even though it had
upheld this same law in South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276, 277 (1950), discussed supra notes 38-
39 and accompanying text.
84. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 589-624 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
85. 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
86. Id at 29 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 22-24, 29-44, 48 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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congressional apportionment decisions from judicial review.81 It then
struck down Georgia's law as violating the one-person, one-vote
principle.89
The Justices' intrusion into electoral matters has continued
unabated. For example, in 1992 the Court relied upon Baker and
Wesberry in unanimously permitting a challenge to Congress's
selection of a method for apportionment of congressional districts
among states under Article I, Section 2.90 Similarly, gerrymandering
of legislative districts no longer raises a political question.91
Most recently, in Bush v. Gore,92 the conservative Republican
majority intervened to break the 2000 presidential election deadlock.
Like a latter-day Justice Harlan, Justice Breyer railed that the Court
had unnecessarily become entangled in a purely political process-
selecting a President.93 He was on solid ground in insisting that the
Constitution contemplates political rather than federal judicial
resolution of presidential election disputes, at least in the first
instance. Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 authorizes "the Legislature"
of "[e]ach State" to "direct" the "manner" of "appoint[ing]...
[presidential] electors." The Florida Legislature had done so by
granting its citizens the right to vote for President and by setting forth
elaborate procedures for counting those votes and certifying electors,
including a system of administrative and judicial review to resolve any
controversies. 94 Moreover, Article II arguably empowers each state's
legislature to appoint its own electors if it concludes that its courts
ignored pre-election statutory directives.95 Finally, if a dispute over a
88. Id. at 5-7 (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,232 (1962)).
89. Id. at 7-18. The majority discovered this principle in Article I, Section 2 of the
Constitution, which provides that "[t]he House of Representatives shall be... chosen...
by the People of the several States" (Clause 1) and that Representatives must be
apportioned "among the several States ... according to their respective Numbers" (Clause
3). Id at 8-18. The Court omitted two facts that contradicted its holding. First, Clause 1
expressly authorizes each state to determine the qualifications needed to vote for
congressional representatives. Second, Clause 3 exclusively concerns the apportionment
of Representatives "among" the states, not within each state. See id. at 25-32 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
90. Dep't of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. 442,456-59 (1992).
91. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109,118-27 (1986).
92. 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam). For a more thorough discussion of this case, see
Pushaw, supra note 6, at 382-86.
93. Bush, 531 U.S. at 152-58 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 100-03 (detailing the relevant statutory procedures and the case history).
95. See id at 104 (interpreting Article II as granting "plenary power" to state
legislatures which could be exercised at any time). Hence, the Florida Legislature may
have had the authority to review the state judiciary's decisions regarding the presidential
election to ensure fidelity to its statutory commands, wholly independent of the United
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state's electoral votes persists, the Twelfth Amendment authorizes
Congress to count-and, by implication, to determine the validity
of--each state's slate of electors.96
Before the Florida Legislature or Congress had acted, however,
the Court held that the Florida Supreme Court had violated the
Equal Protection Clause by ordering a recount of presidential ballots
under the state statutory "intent of the voter" standard without
specifying uniform rules to determine such intent.97 To justify its
short-circuiting of the political process to impose its newly created
"right" to nonvariable counting standards, the majority breezily
explained:
None are more conscious of the vital limits on judicial
authority than are the Members of this Court, and none
stand more in admiration of the Constitution's design to
leave the selection of the President to the people, through
their legislatures, and to the political sphere. When
contending parties invoke the process of the courts,
however, it becomes our unsought responsibility to resolve
the federal and constitutional issues the judicial system has
been forced to confront.98
States Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction over the same subject matter. See, e.g., John
Yoo, A Legislature's Duty, WALL ST. J., Dec. 4,2000, at A24.
96. The Twelfth Amendment provides that the Vice President "shall, in the presence
of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the certificates [transmitted by the
state electors] and the votes shall then be counted." It is not clear whether this
Amendment (1) authorizes the Vice President or Congress to do the counting, and (2)
imposes a mere ministerial duty to count the votes or confers some discretion to regulate
this process.
Congress has long construed the Twelfth Amendment, in tandem with the
Necessary and Proper Clause, as empowering it to legislate the details of presidential
elections. Most pertinently, an 1887 federal statute allows states to attempt to settle any
electoral disputes (either directly or by delegation to courts) and Congress to determine
any remaining controversies-including judging the legality of votes-according to
specified rules. See Bush, 531 U.S. at 153-57 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
Twelfth Amendment and this federal statute required the Court to defer to Congress).
This settled practice reflects a reasonable interpretation of the Constitution. See Laurence
H. Tribe, Bush v. Gore and Its Disguises: Freeing Bush v. Gore From its Hall of Mirrors,
115 HARV. L. REV. 170,278-79 (2001) (contending that the Twelfth Amendment, despite
certain ambiguities, is clear on one point: that presidential election deadlocks should be
broken by Congress rather than the Court).
97. Bush, 531 U.S. at 103-11. Justices Stevens and Ginsburg agreed that the case was
justiciable but condemned the majority for twisting equal protection precedent and
ignoring federalism principles, which dictated deference to the Florida Supreme Court's
interpretation of its state's laws. See id. at 123-28 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 135-44
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
98. Id at 111; see Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2000 Term-Foreword: We
the Court, 115 HARv. L. REV. 4, 153-58 (2001) (maintaining that the Rehnquist Court's
refusal to follow the Constitution's specified political process for resolving presidential
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Tellingly, neither the majority nor the dissenters cited Baker,
thereby unwittingly highlighting its uselessness in distinguishing
"political" from "justiciable" questions. For example, Justice Breyer
implied that the Twelfth Amendment contains "a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue [presidential
election disputes] to a coordinate political department [Congress]." 99
The majority, however, could have responded that this Amendment
says nothing about the Court's power to review state court
interpretations of state law that allegedly violate the Constitution.
Accordingly, the Court owed no more respect to Florida's attempted
resolution of the election snafu than it did to Tennessee's decisions
regarding apportionment. Indeed, federalism concerns cannot raise a
political question, as Justice Brennan enlightened us.7° Moreover,
the only Baker factor that did not necessarily implicate separation of
powers--"a lack of judicially discoverable or manageable
standards"-01-did not apply in Bush because seven Justices
"discovered" a new equal protection "standard,"' 2 exactly as their
brethren did in Baker.
03
In short, the modem political question doctrine does not legally
constrain the Court's ability to interfere in electoral matters, state or
election contests illustrates its more general rejection of the role of democratic institutions
in addressing constitutional problems); Tribe, supra note 96, at 275-92,298-304 (making a
similar argument).
99. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962); see Bush, 531 U.S. at 153-57 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting); Tribe, supra note 96, at 277-80 (asserting that the Constitution plainly
commanded the Court not to intervene and hence that it could not have invoked
discretion to decide the case). An article published over three decades ago, and thus with
no political ax to grind, concluded that the Court would probably apply Baker to rule that
the Twelfth Amendment grants to Congress final power to resolve controversies
concerning presidential electoral voting. Albert J. Rosenthal, The Constitution, Congress,
and Presidential Elections, 67 MICH. L. REV. 1, 26-30 (1968).
100. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
101. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
102. See Bush, 531 U.S. at 103-11. But see id. at 124-27 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting
the novelty of the majority's equal protection analysis); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The
Presidential Election Dispute, the Political Question Doctrine, and the Fourteenth
Amendment: A Reply to Professors Krent and Shane, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 603, 604-05,
610, 619-22 (2001) (agreeing with the many commentators who have demonstrated the
weakness of this aspect of the Court's opinion).
103. Professor Schotland chides me for "attack[ing] all the opinions in Bush v. Gore...
for the tiny point that they failed to cite Baker." Schotland, supra note 60, at 1509 n.19. It
is hardly trivial, however, for the Justices to have neglected to explain why the political
question doctrine (even in its watered-down Baker form) did not require the Court to
respect the constitutional roles of the states and Congress in resolving electoral vote
problems. See Tribe, supra note 96, at 277-81 (characterizing as "remarkable" the
majority's failure to justify its seizure of jurisdiction in the face of a political question
doctrine that seemed squarely applicable).
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federal. In fact, it imposes no meaningful limits on judicial discretion
in any area, as the following cases illustrate.
D. Other "Justiciable" Congressional and Presidential Powers
The Court has chosen to adjudicate seemingly political
challenges to Congress's exercise of various powers. For instance, in
Powell v. McCormack,1°4 it allowed a Representative-elect to contest
the House's decision to refuse to seat him. Powell reveals the infinite
manipulability of the Baker criteria. Most importantly, Article I,
Section 5, Clause 1, which provides that "[e]ach House shall be the
Judge of the Elections, Returns, and Qualifications of its own
Members," demonstrably commits this issue to Congress and does not
lend itself to judicially manageable standards. 5 The Court in Powell
also refused to "adher[e] to a political decision already made,"
showed a "lack of respect" for Congress, caused the House
"embarrassment," and made a discretionary "policy
determination."' 6  Through impressive intellectual gymnastics,
however, the Justices avoided finding a political question.107
Similarly, in cases like INS v. Chadha,18 the Court has inquired
into Congress's procedures for enacting statutes,0 9  despite
separation-of-powers objections and precedent to the contrary.110
104. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
105. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
106. ,d.
107. The Court held that Congress's power to judge its members' "qualifications"
under Section 5, Clause I was limited to the age, citizenship, and residency qualifications
listed in Section 2, Clause 2. Powell, 395 U.S. at 512-50. The opinion cited no evidence,
however, that anyone during the previous 173 years had ever thought that federal courts
could review congressional determinations concerning membership. Moreover, the Court
conceded that Congress had often excluded members-elect for failure to meet
"qualifications" other than the three categories contained in Section 2, Clause 2. Id. at
541-48.
108. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
109. See id. at 940-43 (concluding that the Court could review the Article I provisions
requiring bicameral approval of all statutes and presentment of every bill to the
President); see also United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 389-96 (1990)
(permitting a criminal defendant to assert that a federal statute had not been enacted
pursuant to Article I, Section 7, Clause 1, which provides that "[a]ll Bills for raising
Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives").
110. See, e.g., Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 672-80 (1892) (refusing to allow a party to
question the assurance by Congress and the President that a federal statute had been
properly authenticated and enrolled). Professor Schotland criticizes my treatment of these
two cases by arguing that Field "involved nothing but the finality of official
representations, but Chadha involved both aggrandizement of Congress's power and
encroachment on the executive." Schotland, supra note 60, at 1509 n.19. Although I
admit that these two decisions can be distinguished on various grounds, justiciability is not
2002] REVIVING "REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION"
Likewise, Congress's exercise of its formerly plenary authority over
Indian Tribes has been deemed justiciable."'
Presidents have fared little better in asserting immunity from
judicial review. Most famously, the Court rejected Richard Nixon's
claim of an absolute executive privilege to refuse to obey a subpoena
ordering him to reveal confidential communications with subordinate
executive officials."' Nixon's argument for nonjusticiability had
strong support in Article II and in practice from the beginning of the
Republic,"3 yet the Justices intervened in the most politically
explosive controversy in decades, Watergate. Similarly, even though
executive branch determinations regarding another nation's
compliance with treaties had been considered a political question for
two centuries, the Court applied Baker to hold otherwise in Japan
Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Society."
4
one of them: Either federal courts have power to review whether Congress has complied
with Article I formalities (as Chadha held) or they do not (as Field ruled). Ultimately, I
conclude that the ordinary presumption favoring judicial review applies here, and that
therefore the Court in Chadha correctly intervened. See infra notes 214-15 and
accompanying text.
111. See County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 248-50 (1985); Del.
Tribal Bus. Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73,83-84 (1977).
112. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683,692-97 (1974).
113. Before Nixon, the Court had never suggested that federal judges could compel
disclosure of confidential communications between the President and other executive
officials. Moreover, the text and history of Article II indicate that the Framers created a
"unitary executive" which rests upon the President's exclusive control over his
subordinates in the executive branch. See Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The
Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REv. 1153,
1165-71, 1204-15 (1992).
Professor Schotland defends the Court's holding that recognition of an absolute
executive privilege would impede the "primary constitutional duty of the Judicial Branch
to do justice in criminal prosecutions [under] Article III." Schotland, supra note 60, at
1509 n.19 (citing Nixon, 418 U.S. at 707). In my view, the Court created a balancing test
because enforcing the Constitution (which protects private executive branch
communications) would have been unpalatable under the circumstances, in which
President Nixon had little incentive to aggressively prosecute himself and his political
appointees. Nonetheless, the federal judiciary's "duty . . . to do justice in criminal
prosecutions" is not unlimited, but rather is constrained by the Constitution. For example,
Article II grants the executive department complete discretion to dismiss (or to decline to
institute) criminal proceedings, and a federal court cannot countermand that decision
because it concludes that otherwise criminal justice would not be served.
114. 478 U.S. 221, 229-30 (1986) (ruling justiciable a claim that the Secretary of
Commerce had improperly exercised his statutory power to decline to certify Japan as a
result of its alleged violation of an international whaling treaty).
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E. Two Questions Deemed Political
Since Baker, the Court has found only two questions to be
"political." First, Gilligan v. Morgan"5 held nonjusticiable claims that
the elected branches had been negligent in military training and
procedures."6 Second, in Walter Nixon v. United States,' the Court
ruled impeachment to be a political question. Thus, it dismissed a
complaint by a federal judge that the Senate had violated its Article I,
Section 3, Clause 6 power to "try" impeachments by convicting him
based on a committee report, rather than after a trial in front of the
full Senate."8
But what makes these two questions so different from others not
deemed "political"? Why are military affairs more intractable to
judicial resolution than treaties? Why does Article I commit
impeachment exclusively to Congress, but not the seating of its own
members?" 9 These questions cannot be answered by consulting the
delphic and protean Baker. Indeed, the only legitimate criticism that
can be leveled against the Court in any particular decision applying
Baker is that it acted imprudently, not inconsistently with the "law. ' ' "
Could the Framers possibly have intended such an unprincipled
approach to political questions? The answer is a resounding no.
Moreover, the system the Founders did contemplate, and that the
Federalist Justices implemented, remains superior to the one
concocted in Baker.
115. 413 U.S. 1 (1973).
116. See id. at 5-12 (dismissing a complaint arising out of the National Guard's
shooting of students during the Kent State protests).
117. 506 U.S. 224 (1993).
118. Id. at 226-38.
119. Indeed, Professor Wechsler, writing before Baker, argued that Congresses Article
I powers over its membership and impeachment were the two most clear-cut political
questions. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
HARv. L. REv. 1, 8 (1959).
120. But see Mark Tushnet, Law and Prudence in the Law of Justiciability: The
Transformation and Disappearance of the Political Question Doctrine, 80 N.C. L. REv.
1203, 1204 (2002) (contending that Baker changed the Court's formerly flexible and
prudential approach to political questions into a rule-based legal analysis). The
malleability that characterizes the modem political question doctrine can be seen in other
jurisprudential areas. For example, the Court has authorized federal judges to assert
"inherent authority" to manage litigation and impose sanctions for misconduct-an almost
entirely discretionary judgment call subject to only the vaguest legal "limits." See Robert
J. Pushaw, Jr., The Inherent Powers of Federal Courts and the Structural Constitution, 86
IOWA L. REv. 735,792-93 (2001).
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II. THE FEDERALIST APPROACH: POLITICAL QUESTIONS As
REBUTTING THE PRESUMPTION OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
A. Constitutional Theory, Judicial Review, and Political Questions
The Constitution, on its face, does not specifically confer on
federal courts the authority to examine the constitutionality of the
conduct of political officials (federal or state), and therefore
obviously does not tell us which such actions are immune from this
power. Rather, both judicial review and the exceptions to it (i.e.,
"political questions") derive from the Constitution's underlying
structure and political theory.' Focusing on these constitutional
elements reveals that the Baker Court misunderstood separation of
powers, explicitly eliminated federalism as a consideration, and failed
even to mention the central idea of a written Constitution that
establishes a limited government based upon popular sovereignty.
Recovering the original constitutional understanding would
greatly clarify the political question doctrine. In Hamilton's words,
the Constitution created a "natural presumption" of judicial review
that could be rebutted only by a few "particular provisions."'" To
fully grasp Hamilton's crucial insight, it is necessary to summarize the
Constitution's animating theory."z
The Federalists' enduring contribution to political science was
the relocation of sovereignty from the government (as in England) to
"the People" collectively. 4 The People could write constitutions that
delegated certain specified powers to their representatives in either
the state or national governments, whether in the legislative,
executive, or judicial departments.125
121. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 168-80 (1803); THE FEDERALIST
No. 78, supra note 16, at 522-28; see also infra notes 122-51 and accompanying text
(explaining this point).
122. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 16, at 524-25.
123. The following account draws heavily from Pushaw, supra note 15, at 407-35.
124. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST Nos. 36, 60 (Alexander Hamilton); THE FEDERALIST
No. 84, at 578-79 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961); 2 THE DEBATES IN
THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 423-24, 434-35, 443, 497-99 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1901) (James Wilson)
[hereinafter ELLIOT'S DEBATES]. For the pathbreaking analysis of the revolutionary
implications of the new Federalist concept of popular sovereignty, see GORDON S. WOOD,
THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 259-63, 273-82, 291-348,
362-63, 372-89, 453-63, 530-53, 596-609 (1969).
125. See, e.g., WOOD, supra note 124, at 259-63, 273-82, 291-343, 383-89, 453-63
(citing voluminous sources). Thus, a "double security to the people" was created by
allocating power between the state and federal governments, then subdividing this power
among three branches at each level of government. See 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note
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In our Constitution, "We the People" reserved the bulk of
governmental powers to the states,126 yet established a federal
government strong enough to control truly national matters like
foreign affairs. 127 The Constitution separated this government into
three independent departments and gave each primary responsibility
for exercising one of the three types of governmental power-
"legislative" (making general, prospective laws), "executive"
(administering the laws), and "judicial" (interpreting and applying the
law as necessary to decide a specific case and render a binding
judgment).2 8  Although Congress controlled its lawmaking agenda,
any laws it enacted could be executed only by the President and
expounded authoritatively solely by the judiciary-the
coextensiveness principle.'29 Even though federal judges were not
elected, then, they represented the People by impartially exercising
their Article III "judicial power.
'130
The Founders complemented separation of powers with a system
of checks and balances.'3' First, the Constitution's structure-
featuring autonomous branches with different methods of selection,
constituencies, functions, and modes of action-was designed to keep
each part of the government within its bounds.'32 Second, the
Framers gave each department the ability to resist encroachments
through "checks" (i.e., specific authority to share in, or interfere with,
the primary function of another branch). 33 To illustrate, the
Constitution authorizes the President to take part in the legislative
124, at 257 (Alexander Hamilton); 2 id. at 423-25, 432-34, 443-44, 455-58, 461, 478, 502,
524 (James Wilson); THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 315 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke
ed., 1961).
126. The Tenth Amendment simply confirms this fundamental tenet of constitutional
structure.
127. See, e.g., 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 124, at 496-98 (John Jay).
128. See Pushaw, supra note 15, at 415-18.
129. See 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 124, at 445, 461, 464 (James Wilson); 3 id. at
532 (James Madison); THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 535 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E.
Cooke ed., 1961).
130. Perhaps the Federalists' most radical claim was that federal courts represent the
People. The People decided to appoint judges through a selective process, rather than
have them elected, to ensure their quality and their independence from direct political
pressure. See Pushaw, supra note 15, at 420-22 (setting forth the Federalist view that
federal judges represented the People even though they were not elected).
131. The classic analysis of these issues is found in THE FEDERALIST NoS. 47-51
(James Madison).
132. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 347-49 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke
ed., 1961).
133. See, e.g., id at 349; THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 332 (James Madison) (Jacob E.
Cooke ed., 1961); 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 124, at 302 (Alexander Hamilton); 2
id at 510-11 (James Wilson).
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process through the veto.'3 Similarly, the House can exercise the
"executive" power of impeaching executive or judicial officials, and
the Senate the "judicial" power of trying impeachments and
rendering a final judgment . 35  Third, the Framers required the
President to share with the Senate several powers that in England had
been treated as exclusively "executive," such as appointing executive
officers and judges 13 6 and conducting foreign affairs. 137
By contrast, the Philadelphia Convention delegates deliberately
declined to require federal judges to participate in making or
executing federal law, thereby avoiding judicial entanglement in
partisan policymaking and preserving impartiality.1 38 Hence, courts
could restrain unconstitutional conduct by Congress or the President
only by exercising "judicial power."1 39
Hamilton nicely encapsulated the foregoing political theory in
The Federalist Number 78 and related essays. Initially, he stressed
that the Constitution ensured the quality of federal judges through a
134. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. For discussion of the President's qualified veto,
see THE FEDERALIST No. 73 (Alexander Hamilton); 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note
124, at 446-47 (James Wilson).
135. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6. All the available
historical evidence indicates that the Framers deliberately assigned the impeachment
power exclusively to Congress and intended to foreclose judicial review. See Michael J.
Gerhardt, Rediscovering Nonjusticiability: Judicial Review of Impeachments After Nixon,
44 DUKE L.J. 231, 234, 251-61, 271-73 (1994); Pushaw, supra note 15, at 429-30, 504-05
(citing sources). Most significantly, it would violate basic rule-of-law principles to give
Congress authority to impeach and try judges-the only direct check against judicial
misconduct-and then allow those same judges to determine the appropriate
impeachment standards or to review convictions. See THE FEDERALIST NOs. 79, 81
(Alexander Hamilton). Moreover, the Supreme Court was too small to be entrusted with
discretion over impeachment and might not have the credibility to enforce a judgment
reversing a congressional conviction. See THE FEDERALIST No. 65 (Alexander
Hamilton).
136. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. On the appointment process, see THE
FEDERALIST No. 76, at 513 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961); 1 MAX
FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 66 (1911) (James Madison).
137. For example, Article I, Section 8 gave Congress the power to declare war (Clause
11) and to establish, finance, and regulate the armed forces and militia (Clauses 12-16).
However, Article II, Section 2 designated the President as Commander-in-Chief.
Similarly, the President was authorized to make treaties, but only with the Senate's
"advice and consent" and the approval of two-thirds of its members. See U.S. CONST. art.
II, § 2, cl. 2. The Framers' goal was to ensure cooperative and deliberative action. See,
e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 75 (Alexander Hamilton); 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note
124, at 466,505-07 (James Wilson).
138. See Pushaw, supra note 15, at 431-32 (describing the delegates' rejection of
numerous proposals to involve federal judges in councils to review legislative bills and to
advise the President).
139. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 16, at 524-26; 2 ELLIOT'S
DEBATES, supra note 124, at 445 (James Wilson).
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selective appointment process 140 and guaranteed their independence
by granting them permanent tenure and an undiminished salary.141
Only distinguished jurists insulated from direct political pressure
could properly exercise the "judicial power" of deciding cases
according to the law -most importantly, those arising under the
Constitution, the People's fundamental and supreme law.
14 1
Therefore, Hamilton continued, the Constitution had to control over
clearly inconsistent acts of the legislature or executive.
144
Furthermore, the rule of law dictated that only independent federal
judges could impartially determine whether political actors had
complied with the written constitutional limits on their power;
otherwise, those restrictions would "amount to nothing."1 45
Overall, then, Hamilton concluded that the Constitution created
a "natural presumption" favoring judicial review:
It is not ... to be supposed that the [Constitution could
intend to enable the representatives of the people to
substitute their will to that of their constituents. It is far
more rational to suppose that the courts were designed to be
140. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (providing that the President would appoint judges
with the Senate's advice and consent). Hamilton argued that this elite selection process,
rather than popular election, would produce judges with the greatest knowledge, ability,
and integrity. See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 76 & 77 (Alexander Hamilton); THE
FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 16, at 529-30; THE FEDERALIST No. 79, at 531-32
(Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 51,
supra note 132, at 348 (to the same effect).
141. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (assuring life tenure during "good behavior" and
providing that judicial salaries could be increased but not decreased). Hamilton
maintained that such provisions would secure consistent and impartial adjudication. THE
FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 16, at 522-29. He emphasized that "[t]he complete
independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential in a limited constitution." Id.
at 524. For similar arguments, see THE FEDERALIST No. 79 (Alexander Hamilton); 2
ELLIOT, supra note 124, at 480-81,489 (James Wilson).
142. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 16, at 522-24.
143. The People declared that "[t]his Constitution" is "the supreme Law" and
specifically directed state judges to apply it over conflicting state laws. U.S. CONST. art.
VI. If those judges did not do so, it seems plain that the Supreme Court (or perhaps
inferior federal courts established by Congress) can exercise federal question jurisdiction
to correct such errors. More subtly, Article VI also makes federal laws and treaties passed
"in Pursuance" of the Constitution supreme over state laws, thereby suggesting that
federal courts can review such federal laws to ensure that they complied with
constitutional formalities. See Wechsler, supra note 119, at 2-5. Hamilton described
independent federal courts as "the bulwarks of a limited [C]onstitution" who could ensure
the supremacy of the People's fundamental law by "guard[ing] the [C]onstitution and the
rights of individuals." THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 16, at 524-27.
144. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 16, at 524 (Federal courts must
"declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the [C]onstitution void."); see also id. at
524-27 (elaborating this position).
145. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 16, at 524.
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an intermediate body between the people and the
legislature, in order ... to keep the latter within the limits
assigned to their authority. The interpretation of the laws is
the proper and peculiar province of the courts. A
[C]onstitution is in fact, and must be, regarded by the judges
as a fundamental law. It therefore belongs to them to
ascertain its meaning as well as the meaning of any
particular act proceeding from the legislative body. If there
should happen to be an irreconcilable variance between the
two, that which has the superior obligation and validity
ought of course to be preferred; or in other words, the
[C]onstitution ought to be preferred to the statute, the
intention of the people to the intention of their agents.
Nor does this conclusion by any means suppose a
superiority of the judicial to the legislative power. It only
supposes that the power of the people is superior to both;
and that where the will of the legislature declared in its
statutes, stands in opposition to that of the people declared
in the [C]onstitution, the judges ought to be governed by the
latter, rather than by the former. They ought to regulate
their decisions by the fundamental laws .... 146
Yet Hamilton recognized that this presumption could be rebutted:
If it be said that the legislative body are themselves the
constitutional judges of their own powers, and that the
construction they put upon them is conclusive upon the
other departments, it may be answered, that this cannot be
the natural presumption, where it is not to be collected from
any particular provisions in the [C]onstitution.147
Elsewhere in The Federalist, Hamilton left little doubt about
some of the "particular provisions" he had in mind. Most obviously,
Congress had unreviewable discretion in exercising its impeachment
power.4 8  Similarly immune from judicial examination were the
146. Id at 525. Other leading Federalists echoed Hamilton's argument that the
Constitution's structure and theory supported the exercise of judicial review. See, e.g., 2
ELLIOT, supra note 124, at 445-46, 478, 489 (James Wilson); 2 FARRAND, supra note 136,
at 73-78 (James Madison).
147. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 16, at 524-25.
148. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 79, supra note 140, at 532-33. Perhaps most
significantly, Hamilton identified impeachment as an "important constitutional check"-
indeed, "a complete security" against judicial usurpation. THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at
545-46 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). This statement would make no
sense if he thought that federal courts could review congressional impeachment
determinations. See also supra note 135 and accompanying text (describing the consensus
on this point among the Framers and Ratifiers).
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constitutional provisions authorizing Congress to declare war 149 and
the Senate to give the President advice and consent on treaties and
appointments.1 50 And although Hamilton confined his analysis in The
Federalist Number 78 to judicial review of legislative acts, his
rationale applies equally to the President's conduct, and his analysis
of various executive powers (for example, the veto and the
President's role as Commander-in-Chief and in foreign affairs)
suggests unmistakably that they are political questions.'
5 1
The Hamiltonian approach to judicial review and political
questions was faithfully implemented by the Federalist Justices who
dominated the Supreme Court during its first several decades.1 52
Indeed, this model lasted until the early twentieth century.15 3
B. The First Century of the Supreme Court's Political Question
Doctrine
1. Early Decisions
The Jay and Ellsworth Courts often simply exercised power to
review the constitutionality of the actions of federal and state
officials, thereby implicitly concluding that they did not raise political
questions. For instance, in Hollingsworth v. Virginia,54 the Justices
rejected the argument that the Eleventh Amendment's adoption had
violated Article I, Section 7 because of the failure to present it to the
President for his approval. The Court ruled that this approval/veto
power applied only to ordinary legislative bills, not to constitutional
amendments. 55 Obviously, the Justices would not have rendered this
opinion if they had thought that the amendment process involved
political issues that the judiciary was incompetent to entertain. In
fact, during its first decade the Court explicitly recognized only one
nonjusticiable area: federal political officials' determinations as to
149. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
150. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. For a defense of shared political-branch control over
appointments and treaties, see THE FEDERALIST Nos. 75 & 76 (Alexander Hamilton).
151. See THE FEDERALIST No. 73 (Alexander Hamilton) (veto); id. Nos. 69, 74
(Alexander Hamilton) (Commander-in-Chief); id No. 75 (Alexander Hamilton) (foreign
affairs). Hamilton never mentioned any possibility of judicial review of such executive
decisions, and it is fair to say that such a prospect would have been unimaginable to him.
152. See infra notes 154-73 and accompanying text.
153. See infra notes 174-96 and accompanying text.
154. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798).
155. Id. at 381 n.1.
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whether a foreign country had breached a treaty and/or taken hostile
actions that constituted war.1
56
The Marshall Court supplied a more systematic analysis of
judicial review and political questions. Most significantly, Marbury v.
Madison5' adopted the Hamiltonian position.5 1 Chief Justice
Marshall argued that judges had to decide particular cases by
expounding the law, that the Constitution contained the supreme and
fundamental law, and that therefore the Court had to enforce the
Constitution and not a plainly unconstitutional act of Congress.'59 In
another part of the opinion, the Court held that the judiciary could
examine whether executive officials had complied with particular
"ministerial" (i.e., nondiscretionary) statutory obligations in order to
remedy any violation of vested legal rights, despite possible political
implications.760
Chief Justice Marshall acknowledged, however, that "[q]uestions
in their nature political, or which are, by the Constitution and laws,
submitted to the executive, can never be made in this court.''161 Two
examples were the President's nomination of executive officers and
foreign policy decisions that did not abridge individual legal rights. 62
The Court made it clear that, in such situations, the President's
exercise of discretion is necessarily "legal" and hence cannot infringe
anyone's "rights"-not that certain violations of legal rights cannot be
remedied.163
Similarly, Martin v. Mott"6 sustained a law authorizing the
President to determine whether an emergency required mobilizing
the militia to defend against an invasion65 The Court then held that
judicial review of the President's decision would unduly compromise
his Article II power as Commander-in-Chief and might jeopardize
national security, and therefore deemed the matter a political
question. 66
156. See Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199,221-96 (1796).
157. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
158. Although the Marbury Court did not use Hamilton's "rebuttable presumption"
language, it incorporated his analytical framework almost exactly. See supra note 147 and
accompanying text (citing Hamilton's terminology).
159. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 176-80.
160. Id. at 154-73.
161. Id. at 170.
162. Id. at 166-67.
163. Id. at 164-71.
164. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19 (1827).
165. Id. at 28-29.
166. Id. at 29-32.
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The Marshall Court also recognized that Congress had exclusive
discretion in exercising certain powers, such as declaring war 67 and
related matters (for instance, interpreting America's treaty
obligations and determining the rights of foreigners during
wartime). 1 8 In Gibbons v. Ogden,169 the Court held that its review
under the Commerce Clause was restricted to ensuring that Congress
had actually regulated "commerce" (i.e., trading and transporting
goods and related market transactions) "among the several states"
(i.e., commerce that concerned more than one state, as opposed to
purely internal state transactions).17  Otherwise, Chief Justice
Marshall declared:
[Plower over commerce ... is vested in Congress ...
absolutely.... The wisdom and the discretion of Congress,
their identity with the people, and the influence which their
constituents possess at election, are, in this, as in many other
instances, as that, for example, of declaring war, the sole
restraints on which they have relied, to secure them from its
abuse. They are the restraints on which the people must
often rely solely, in all representative governments.
171
Finally, the Court often considered federalism issues in declining
to become entangled in political disputes. For instance, in Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia,'72 the Court held that it lacked original jurisdiction
to enjoin Georgia's assertion of power to abolish the Cherokee
Tribe-an interpretation heavily influenced by the delicate political
situation in that state.
173
In sum, during its formative years the Supreme Court routinely
asserted power to review the constitutionality of actions of political
officials, except when the Constitution's text, structure, and theory
167. Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 28 (1801).
168. United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610,634-35 (1818).
169. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
170. Id. at 189-99.
171. Id. at 197. For an extensive treatment of Gibbons, see Grant S. Nelson & Robert
J. Pushaw, Jr., Rethinking the Commerce Clause: Applying First Principles to Uphold
Federal Commercial Regulations but Preserve State Control Over Social Issues, 85 IOWA L.
REv. 1, 57-63, 119-31 (1999) [hereinafter Nelson & Pushaw, Rethinking the Commerce
Clause] (contending that the original meaning of the Article I power "to regulate
commerce among the several states," as correctly interpreted by the Marshall Court, was
to give Congress broad authority to regulate all activities intended for the interstate
marketplace, and that this understanding can be applied today to salvage most legislation
enacted under this Clause); see also Robert J. Pushaw, Jr. & Grant S. Nelson, A Critique of
the Narrow Interpretation of the Commerce Clause, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 695, 696-719 (2002)
(defending this thesis against a challenge by Professor Randy Barnett).
172. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
173. Id. at 15-20.
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indicated that a particular question had to be left exclusively to
elected governmental officials for final determination (for example,
congressional and presidential decisions concerning military and
foreign affairs, the President's appointment power, and Congress's
evaluation about the need for interstate commercial regulations).
When the exercise of otherwise purely political powers allegedly
invaded individual legal rights, however, the Court typically would
hear the injured party's claim but show extraordinary deference to
the political branches.
2. Luther and its Progeny
The post-Marshall Court continued this pattern. The seminal
case is Luther v. Borden.174 Luther involved the Rhode Island
government, which had existed continuously since being granted a
royal charter in 1663 and had refused to reapportion its legislature to
recognize the great population shift from rural areas to cities such as
Providence. 175 In 1841, a special convention drafted, and a majority of
the state's citizens ratified, a new state constitution, under which a
competing government was elected. 76 The charter government
refused to recognize the new regime and declared temporary martial
law to fight it. 77  In 1842, a sheriff of the charter government
(Borden) broke into the home of an official of the new one (Luther)
to search for evidence of rebellious activity 7 Luther brought a
trespass action against Borden, who defended his search as
authorized by his government. Luther then claimed that Borden had
lacked legal power to act because the charter government violated the
Republican Form of Government Clause.179 The Rhode Island courts
had uniformly ruled that the legitimacy of the charter government
was a question for political rather than judicial resolution. 180
The U.S. Supreme Court held that the Guarantee Clause did not
empower it to decide Luther's claim.'' The opinion began by
emphasizing two federalism concerns. First, the Court should respect
the Rhode Island judiciary's interpretation of state law. 8' Second,
174. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849). For further discussion of this decision, see Pushaw,
supra note 6, at 361-62; Pushaw, supra note 15, at 453-54.
175. See Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 35.
176. Id. at 35-36.
177. Id. at 34-38.
178. Id at 34-35.
179. Id. at 34-38.
180. Id. at 38-39.
181. Id at 39-45.
182. Id at 39-40.
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the Justices cautioned that declaring the charter government
unconstitutional would invalidate all of its actions-a chaotic result to
be avoided unless the Constitution clearly compelled it.'8' Turning to
separation-of-powers considerations, the Court ruled that it had to
yield to Congress's judgment that the charter government was the
legitimate one and hence "republican."'18 Moreover, as Congress had
given the President sole discretion to decide when exigencies required
calling out the militia to suppress an insurrection, and as he had
exercised this power by recognizing the charter government, the
Court must defer to him, just as it had acceded to the President's
analogous recognition of a foreign government.8 5
In short, Luther's finding of nonjusticiability rested upon both
federalism and separation-of-powers grounds, and it was limited to
the unique situation where the state courts and the federal political
branches had already determined that one of two rival state
governments was valid. The Court did not hold that all complaints
under the Guarantee Clause raised political questions. For example,
it accepted the validity of Rhode Island's temporary declaration of
martial law to meet threats to its very existence, but declined "to
inquire to what extent, []or under what circumstances, that power
may be exercised by a State" before a Guarantee Clause violation
would occur.8 6  This qualifier would be incomprehensible if the
Justices believed they never could consider whether a state's actions
offended that Clause.
Indeed, the Court thereafter adjudicated many such cases. For
example, in Minor v. Happersett,187 it did not mention any political
question bar in hearing the claim, which ultimately proved
unsuccessful, that a state's failure to grant its female citizens the right
to vote ran afoul of the Republican Form of Government Clause.',
Similarly, In re Duncan'89 held on the merits that a particular state
court interpretation of a state statute to ascertain whether it had been
duly enacted did not violate this Clause. 9 Likewise, in Forsyth v.
Hammond,9' the Court treated as justiciable (although it rejected)
183. Id. at 38-39.
184. Id. at 42.
185. Id. at 43-45.
186. Id. at 45. The Baker Court's failure to mention this sentence is inexplicable, given
its intent to limit the scope of the political question doctrine.
187. 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1875).
188. Id. at 175-76.
189. 139 U.S. 449 (1891).
190. Id. at 461-62.
191. 166 U.S. 506 (1897).
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the complaint that a state could not, consistent with this Clause, leave
the determination of the territorial boundaries of municipalities to its
courts rather than its legislature."9  As late as 1905, the Court
rendered two substantive decisions involving this Clause, again
declining to declare state governments unconstitutional.193
Overall, Luther and its progeny established that the Guarantee
Clause did not automatically raise a political question, but that it
would be interpreted with great deference to the states' actions.
Other cases, however, began to intimate that claims under this Clause
were nonjusticiable, particularly when Congress had already
determined that a state's government was republican.194 Those
decisions eventually metamorphosed into a full-blown ban on
Republican Form of Government claims beginning in 1912.195
During the nineteenth century, however, the Court followed the
Luther approach-exercising jurisdiction but with due deference to
elected officials-in other areas. For instance, the Court always
adjudicated cases implicating foreign affairs when individual legal
rights were at stake, but it usually accepted as the governing rule the
legal interpretation previously proffered by the political branches.196
As described earlier, however, the Court in the twentieth century
gradually lost sight of the Federalist model of judicial review and
political questions. 97 Indeed, the doctrine was in such intellectual
192. Id at 519.
193. See Michigan ex rel. Kies v. Lowrey, 199 U.S. 233, 239 (1905) (concluding that a
state legislature did not render its government non-republican by creating, altering, and
dividing the property of school districts); South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437,
454 (1905) (finding no violation under this Clause). Other examples of the justiciability of
such claims include Foster v. Kansas ex rel. Johnson, 112 U.S. 201 (1884), and Kennard v.
Louisiana ex rel. Morgan, 92 U.S. 480 (1875).
194. See, e.g., Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244,278-79 (1900) (avoiding the question of
whether Congress must establish republican governments in the territories before they
become states). The earliest case applying this analysis was Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. (6
Wall.) 50,71-77 (1867), wherein the Court refused to second-guess Congress's abolition of
Georgia's government during Reconstruction. Given the situation, where Congress had
made it clear it would impeach any federal official, judicial or executive, who interfered
with Reconstruction, this precedent is not terribly persuasive. See also Taylor & Marshall
v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548 (1899) (holding nonjusticiable a complaint that Kentucky's
resolution of a contested election for governor deprived voters of a republican
government).
195. See supra notes 22-31,35-40 and accompanying text.
196. For exhaustive evidence establishing this point, see Theodore Y. Blumoff, Judicial
Review, Foreign Affairs and Legislative Standing, 25 GA. L. REv. 227, 259-62, 266-74,
283-92,304-05,326-27 (1991).
197. See supra notes 22-41 and accompanying text; see also Kramer, supra note 98, at
13, 110-20 (demonstrating that, before the twentieth century, the Court adhered to an
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disarray by 1962 that it was fairly easy for the Warren Court to
cherry-pick material in various cases to support its result. As we have
seen, however, the Baker analysis depends almost entirely on the
discretion of the majority of the Justices, untethered to any legal
principles rooted in the Constitution's structure, theory, history, or
early precedent. Surely the Court can do better than this.
III. REVIVING THE "REBUTrABLE PRESUMPTION" ANALYSIS
Critics might respond to my proposal by claiming that "you can't
turn the clock back" and that Americans should not be legally bound
by the "dead hand" of the Federalists. That argument might be
persuasive if we were dealing with a subject on which the original
understanding has been thoroughly repudiated and would therefore
provide no useful legal guidance (for example, the Framers' ideas
concerning race and gender). But here we are addressing
fundamental issues of constitutional structure and political theory,
and I submit that on such matters the Founders had certain insights
that are timeless and uniquely valuable, despite the massive changes
in America's government over the past two centuries. 198
Specifically, I believe that the Hamilton/Marshall approach to
political questions still makes sense: The Constitution creates a
powerful yet rebuttable presumption in favor of judicial review1 9
This presumption can be overcome only when government officials
exercise certain powers (e.g., the veto, impeachment, appointments,
and military and foreign policy decisions) that do not fit within the
usual framework of making, executing, and judging the law-the triad
that undergirds the coextensiveness principle, which in turn provides
a key justification for horizontal judicial review.2°° Because "We the
expansive political question doctrine that sharply distinguished judicially reviewable
"legal" issues from nonjusticiable "political" ones).
198. I recognize that the Civil War and Reconstruction, the New Deal, and the Warren
Court's jurisprudence have virtually destroyed the original conception of federalism,
which contemplated a relatively limited role for the federal government. Obviously, the
elimination of the racist "states' rights" strain of federalism is an incontestable
improvement. Nonetheless, uniform federal rules, whether imposed by Congress or the
Court, have undercut the healthy diversity of approaches that results when states control
their own political systems and laws reflecting their citizens' social, moral, and cultural
norms. See Nelson & Pushaw, Rethinking the Commerce Clause, supra note 171, at 113-
19. Thus, I do not accept the contention that Baker supplies the correct approach to
political questions because it follows the modern trend of ignoring all concerns for the
states' ability to operate their governments.
199. The following argument is a condensed version of that presented in Pushaw, supra
note 15, at 497-511.
200. See supra notes 121-51 and accompanying text.
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People" entrusted their federal government representatives with
complete latitude in these areas, by definition the exercise of such
discretion cannot violate the Constitution.20 1
The clearest illustrations of true political questions are the
Constitution's two classical checks. First, the President has absolute
discretion in deciding whether to veto or approve a bill,20 and this
exception to the Constitution's otherwise exclusive delegation of
"legislative power" to Congress would be vitiated if federal courts
also asserted the authority to share in the lawmaking process.
Second, impeachments are the sole grant of "judicial power" to
Congress. Again, this explicit exception to the judiciary's core
constitutional function would be difficult to comprehend if courts
could exercise their normal judicial review power in the context of
impeachment 3 Therefore, the Court reached the right result in
Walter Nixon v. United States,2°I albeit through the application of
Baker's amorphous factors (especially the "textual commitment" one)
rather than through an explanation grounded in constitutional
structure and theory
0 5
The Framers fully grasped the inherently political nature of
vetoes and impeachments, and in conferring these checks accepted
the possibility of their abuse and counted on the political process
alone to curb any excesses: A President who repeatedly thwarts the
popular will expressed by Congress, or a Congress that impeaches
unwisely, will pay a heavy political price.2 6 The Founders' faith has
been vindicated by over two hundred years of practice, which has
generally featured a restrained exercise of such checks and has never
required judicial review to police the occasional misguided veto or
impeachment.
Another type of political question involves the constitutionally
mandated sharing between the President and Congress of certain
powers that before 1787 had been considered "executive." For
instance, the President appoints federal executive and judicial
officers, but only with the Senate's advice and consent.207  A
disappointed office-seeker cannot obtain judicial review of the
201. See supra notes 131-51 and accompanying text.
202. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, el. 2; see supra notes 134,151 and accompanying text.
203. See supra notes 135, 148 and accompanying text. Moreover, the Anglo-American
maxim that court judgments must be final applies even where the tribunal is composed of
legislators.
204. 506 U.S. 224 (1993).
205. See supra notes 135,148 and accompanying text.
206. See Pushaw, supra note 15, at 505-07.
207. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; see supra notes 136, 150, 162 and accompanying text.
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political branches' decision, however unfair it may seem, because he
has no legal "right" to the office.
208
Other shared powers concern military and foreign affairs. For
example, only Congress can declare war and raise and support armies,
but the President is Commander-in-Chief. 29 Likewise, although the
President negotiates treaties, they require the Senate's advice,
consent, and approval 10 The early Supreme Court recognized that
the allocation of these discretionary powers to the political
departments excluded judicial review, except in very rare
circumstances when their exercise plainly violated an individual's
vested legal rights.2 1' The modern Court has correctly continued to
hold that the process of making foreign and military policy, which
affects all Americans equally, raises political questions 2 To
illustrate, the negotiation, ratification, and termination of treaties are
nonjusticiable issues.
213
Except for vetoes, impeachments, and foreign policy, all other
constitutional provisions enjoy an irrebuttable presumption of
reviewability. For example, in cases such as INS v. Chadha,21 4 the
Court has properly entertained claims that Congress failed to enact
laws according to Article I formalities 1 5 Instead of its ritualistic
incantation and application of the Baker factors, the Court should
simply have held that Article I's provisions delineating the
procedures for enacting statutes are as amenable to judicial review as
any other part of the Constitution, and that nothing in the
Constitution's structure, theory, or history rebuts this presumption.
For similar reasons, the allegation that a constitutional amendment
did not comply with the requirements of Article V should have been
208. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION 102 (1987)
(concluding that the only truly discretionary political questions are appointments and
vetoes).
209. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8; U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2; see supra notes 137, 149, 151, 165-
68 and accompanying text.
210. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; see supra notes 137, 150, 156, 168 and accompanying
text.
211. See supra notes 156-73 and accompanying text (citing cases).
212. See, e.g., Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973) (refusing to grant an injunction
requiring judicial review of military training); see also supra note 116 and accompanying
text (discussing Gilligan).
213. See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002-06 (1979) (plurality opinion)
(concluding that Senators cannot judicially challenge the President's termination of a
treaty). Of course, individuals granted rights by treaties may seek redress for infringement
of those rights pursuant to statutes enacted under Article III, which confers federal
jurisdiction over all cases arising under treaties. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
214. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
215. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
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deemed justiciable in Coleman v. Miller.z16  Because the amended
Constitution is the People's supreme law, and because federal courts
must uphold that law, they cannot allow Congress total power over
amendments, as the early Justices recognized but their modem
counterparts have forgotten.
217
Finally, and most pertinently for present purposes, certain
constitutional provisions are justiciable but should be interpreted with
extraordinary deference to the elected branches.218  To illustrate,
military or foreign affairs decisions that allegedly violate individual
legal rights (as contrasted with those that concern all Americans) are
judicially reviewable, but under standards that resolve every doubt in
favor of the validity of the government's action. 9  Similarly, the
Constitution gives Congress vast authority over federal electoral
mattersm0 and generally grants states free rein over their internal
governmental systems. Therefore, the Court should not upset federal
or state electoral determinations unless they violate established
constitutional rights.PI For instance, in Bush v. Gore,222 the Court
should have waited until the Florida Legislature had discharged its
Article II duty to appoint its state's presidential electors and Congress
had fulfilled its obligations under the Twelfth Amendment to count
216. 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
217. See supra notes 154-55 and accompanying text; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra
note 208, at 103-04 (arguing that "judicial review is necessary to ensure that the political
process does not disregard the restrictions of Article V"). The contrary conclusion in
Coleman lacks a foundation in traditional constitutional theory, history, and precedent.
See supra notes 20-21,154-55 and accompanying text (citing sources).
218. See supra p. 1193 and notes 186-96,211 and accompanying text.
219. In practice, the Court has shown almost blind deference to political-branch
judgments about military and foreign policy, even when those decisions seemed to
contravene the most fundamental constitutional rights and liberties. The most sobering
example is Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), in which the Court ruled on
the merits that the federal government's internment of Japanese-Americans during World
War II did not infringe their due process or equal protection rights. Id. at 216-18. In my
view, the Court properly found the claim justiciable, but took a course of abdication rather
than deference in upholding a clear-cut violation of the Constitution, as several dissenters
argued. See id. at 225-33 (Roberts, J., dissenting); id. at 233-42 (Murphy, J., dissenting);
id. at 242-48 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
220. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4 (empowering Congress to "make or alter" state
regulations concerning "[t]he Times, Places, and Manner" of congressional elections); U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (authorizing Congress to apportion seats in the House of
Representatives); see also Wechsler, supra note 119, at 8-9 (contending that these
provisions granted Congress a power to draw election districts that is immune from
judicial review).
221. Specifically, the Fifteenth Amendment protects members of minority groups from
discrimination by a state in the exercise of their voting rights. See supra notes 41, 52 and
accompanying text.
222. 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
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and certify each state's electoral votes.223 At that point, the Court
should have asserted jurisdiction but deferred to the decisions of the
political officials, absent a plain violation of an existing constitutional
right-as opposed to minting a new equal protection "right" to be
applied to that case only. 4
The foregoing analysis suggests that the Court in Baker did have
the power to exercise judicial review, although its explanation for
doing so was unpersuasive. The majority should have candidly
admitted that the plaintiffs' claim-that a state apportionment statute
diluted urban votes---did not arise under the Equal Protection Clause,
but rather under the Republican Form of Government Clause.' The
Court reached the opposite conclusion because it incorrectly assumed
that all complaints under the latter Clause raised political questions.
Instead, Justice Brennan should have acknowledged that Luther v.
Borden06 did not create such a prohibition, that the Court had
decided many Guarantee Clause claims until 1912, and that since then
it had misinterpreted Luther in many cases-including those involving
challenges to state apportionments227
As in Luther and its progeny, however, the Court should have
construed the Republican Form of Government Clause with
tremendous deference to both the states and the federal political
departments, whose judgments should not be overturned except in
the most compelling circumstances (such as a state's establishment of
martial law or a theocracy)." Although these possibilities may seem
farfetched, that is precisely the point: Federal courts would be
warranted in invalidating governments as "unrepublican" only in
egregious situations, which would be highly unlikely to arise because
of the political ramifications for elected officials who dared to take
223. See id. at 152-58 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (detailing this argument).
224. See Pushaw, supra note 6, at 392-402 (developing this thesis); see also Frank I.
Michelman, Suspicion, or the New Prince, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 679, 684-85 (2001)
(describing the novelty and implausibility of the Court's equal protection holding).
225. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 122 (1980); see also
McConnell, supra note 60, at 106 (maintaining that the Court should have rested its
decision on the Guarantee Clause and invalidated only those apportionment laws, like
Tennessee's in Baker, that thwarted republican government by preventing majority rule).
226. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
227. See supra notes 22-40, 174-97 and accompanying text (citing this precedent); see
also New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 184-85 (1992) (recognizing that scholars
had convincingly demonstrated that the Court before 1912 had often decided cases
involving this Clause).
228. Recall that the Court in Luther held that a state's temporary declaration of martial
law had not violated the Republican Form of Government Clause, but intimated that
permanent martial law would. Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 45, discussed supra notes 177,
186 and accompanying text.
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such actions. Thus, the Court in Baker should have upheld the
implicit determination of Congress and the President that state
apportionment laws which reflected geography and interest-group
influence (for example, favoring agricultural over urban areas) did
not run afoul of the Guarantee Clause. 9 Although a "democratic"
government might require that representation rest solely on
population, a "republican" government does not; otherwise, the
Senate and the Electoral College would be unconstitutionalO °
That is not to say, however, that federal judges should accede to
political-branch interpretations of the Republican Form of
Government Clause that violate recognized individual constitutional
rights. For instance, the Court properly struck down state electoral
laws that discriminated against black voters in contravention of their
Fifteenth Amendment rights. 1  Nothing in the text, history, or
precedent of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause,
however, prevented states from establishing legislative districts based
upon non-invidious considerations such as geography. 2
Consequently, the Court in Baker should have taken jurisdiction,
deferred to the state and federal government's determination that
Tennessee had a republican government, and held that the plaintiffs
had failed to state a claim under the Equal Protection Clause.
CONCLUSION
Although the majority in Baker correctly found the case to be
justiciable, they did so by creating and applying an ahistorical, totally
discretionary multifactor approach that has not produced, and cannot
yield, legally consistent results. By contrast, my proposed
Hamiltonian model has deep historical roots, a sound legal basis, and
the potential to make sense out of the political question doctrine.
Thus, I suggest that the Court go "back to the future" and adopt a
strong presumption that the power of judicial review should be
exercised, absent persuasive evidence that the Constitution's
structure, political philosophy, history, and formative precedent make
a question suitable for political resolution only.
229. See supra notes 28-60 and accompanying text.
230. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
231. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
232. See supra notes 37-52 and accompanying text.
1201
1202 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
